An increasing number of PSA programs concerning research reactors have been launched across the world. As with many other reactors, the CMRR (China Mianyang Research Reactor), a typical pool-type research reactor, regards the control rod shutdown system (CRSS) as its primary shutdown system which enables the reactor subcritical by dropping control rods into the core after a specific initiating event is detected. As a result, the CRSS is an essential ingredient of engineered safety features. It is necessary to enhance the reliability of the CRSS, ensuring the reactor can be successfully shut down when the ATWS — the anticipated transients without scram occurs. Therefore, additional facilities should be designed to cope with the extremely severe circumstance. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the promotion of the CMRR’s safety degree and the reliability of its CRSS from the PSA’s perspective with an ATWS mitigation system installed. Results indicate that, by introducing the ATWS mitigation system, the failure probability of the CRSS can decrease from 1.52e−05 per demand to 3.35e−06 per demand, while the aggregate CDF (core damage frequency) induced by all IE (initiating event) groups, is able to decrease to a relatively low value 1.17e−05/y from its previous value 3.11e−06/y. It is apparent that the reliability of the CRSS as well as the safety degree of the overall reactor can be enhanced effectively by adding the ATWS mitigation system to the elementary design of the normal CRSS.
- Nuclear Engineering Division
A PSA Case Study: Promoting the Reliability of the CRSS on the CMRR Through the ATWS Mitigation System
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Yu, H, Wang, G, Qian, D, Guo, Y, & Hu, B. "A PSA Case Study: Promoting the Reliability of the CRSS on the CMRR Through the ATWS Mitigation System." Proceedings of the 2018 26th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. Volume 2: Plant Systems, Structures, Components, and Materials; Risk Assessments and Management. London, England. July 22–26, 2018. V002T14A011. ASME. https://doi.org/10.1115/ICONE26-81755
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